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"Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators.... 
It is [not] the wish of [our] government to impose upon you alien institutions." 
- British General Frederick Stanley Maude, Baghdad, 1917 
Ominous Times 
Despite the monumental events of the last year, Iraqi Shi'ites[2] see continuity in the political 
culture of Iraq. U.S. actions are viewed through the prism of a century of disenfranchisement and 
oppression, much of which can be attributed to the decisions of past colonizers. Nevertheless, 
there is every indication that Iraqi Shi'ites are going to fight to try and transform the political 
landsacpe; it may be their last chance in this generation to regain what they feel is their rightful 
place in Mesopotamia. 
Iraq is facing a future less certain than at any time in its history—a future that will begin on June 
30 when the Coalition Provisional Government ceases to exist and a new temporary 
governmental entity comes into being. There are some ominous signs that this transition has 
been extremely ill-conceived, and is likely to lead to more violence and breakdown. At this writing 
in late April 2004, the U.S. government is telling the world that Iraq will be granted sovereignty, 
but we now realize that the United States will not relinquish control of the military to the next 
provisional government. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman called this 
"limited sovereignty" before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 22. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, testifying before the same committee, also said that the 
new government was basically there to set up elections in January 2005.  
In the eyes of Iraqis, and particularly the Shi'ites, who view events with cultural memory, the 
current "culture" is the same one that has pervaded for more than seventy years. Today's events 
seem like those of the earliest days of Iraq's existence.[3] Here it is important to make a clear 
distinction between what one might call "scientific history," dealing in objective causal explanation 
for events, and "cultural memory," in which events are "remembered" in a way that creates causal 
links between the present and the past, whether these memories are accurate or not. When they 
are widely believed, such memories have the force of fact, and can be strong motivators for 
public action.  
A Replay of Colonial Patterns 
Gertrude Bell and her superior in the administration of British rule in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox, were 
charged with creating a nation out of whole cloth that would serve British colonial interests.[4] 
They did their job well. They created a Kurdish buffer against Turkey in the north under their 
control, rather than as an independent state. They installed favored Sunni rulers in Baghdad, with 
a Hashemite King, Emir Feisal of Mecca, at the head. Most importantly, they institutionalized 
repression of the Shi'ites in the South. The British governance of Iraq was, according to historian 
Charles Tripp, a combination of "direct and indirect rule."[5] This sounds suspiciously like 
Grossman's "limited sovereignty." If American's don't know their history, Iraqis definitely have a 
strong sense of theirs, and they see the United States as directly continuing the policies of Great 
Britain. The British ruled under a Mandate from the League of Nations. The United States, too, 
has claimed a larger authority as justification for its rule in Iraq. Saddam Hussein's violation of UN 
resolutions has been used by the Bush administration as a mandate for both the American 
invasion and subsequent rule. The Iraqis read the American "mandate" as the equivalent of the 
British Mandate. It is also seen as just as illegitimate.  
It should be obvious that the Iraqis are now revolting against the United States in a manner 
similar to the way that they revolted against Great Britain in 1920 and again in 1958, when the 
British were removed once and for all. The circumstances behind the revolt of 1920 and the 
revolution of 1958 are vastly different, but all three events stem broadly from a desire on the part 
of the Iraqis to strike out at what they see as oppression by an unwelcome outside power.  
Charles Tripp writes that the Revolt of 1920 "began in Baghdad with mass demonstrations of 
urban Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi'ite, and the protests of embittered ex-Ottoman officers. The 
revolt gained momentum when it spread to the largely Shi'ite regions of the middle and lower 
Euphrates. Well-armed tribesmen, outraged by the intrusions of central government and resentful 
of infidel rule, seized control of most of the south of the country. It took the British several months, 
and cost thousands of lives—British, Indian and Iraqi—to suppress the revolt and re-establish 
Baghdad's control."[6]  
The Revolt was the act that convinced the British that they needed to establish their puppet 
regime. Never mind that many Iraqis accepted Emir Feisal as king. His later rule and successors 
were seen as dominated by the British. If the United States now establishes its own puppet 
regime in Baghdad, the symbolic parallel with the British action after World War I will be 
complete, and nothing will be able to convince the skeptics in Iraq that the United States has any 
interest there except colonial domination.  
Understanding Shi'ites 
Despite her superb knowledge of Persian and Arabic, Bell never really understood the Shi'ites. 
Indeed, she would be at home in the current administration, for she feared that if the Shi'ites had 
control in Iraq they would soon be demanding Islamic rule that would be anti-Western and anti-
modern. The world had to wait for many years before the first sympathetic pictures of Shi'ites 
emerged. Wilfred Thesinger[7] and later Robert[8] and Elizabeth Fernea[9] finally painted 
authentic, detailed pictures of these southern denizens. No one reads them, however, and the 
persistent image of Shi'ites as wild-eyed fanatics continues to be promulgated by the press, and 
more importantly by the Bush administration.[10]  
However, one fact has hit home, due largely to the hugely important influence of Grand Ayatollah 
Ali al-Sistani of Najaf, whose opinions are followed by Iraqi Shi'a as if they were edicts from God. 
The Shi'ite community is likely to be the key to any stability or instability in the country and they 
have been waiting to assume what they consider their rightful place in the region for nearly a 
century. They are mad, they are frustrated, and once again, their colonial masters are trying to 
sideline them. Little wonder they are fighting back.  
The U.S. government has apparently not the slightest appreciation about the nature or functioning 
of the Shi'ite community. It was clear from the very beginning that for Washington, a Shi'ite was a 
Shi'ite was a Shi'ite. Dating back to the Iran-Iraq war, the United States assumed that the Shi'ites 
in Iraq were natural allies of the Shi'ites in Iran. They learned that things were not so simplistic but 
the complexity of the Shi'ite world never filtered up to the White House-neither in Democratic nor 
Republican administrations.  
This blind spot has led to the unwarranted assumption that if Shi'ites were to run a post-conflict 
Iraqi government, they would install an "Iranian-style theocracy" in Iraq, to quote Vice President 
Dick Cheney. Both Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld have said repeatedly that 
the fundamentalist Shi'ites will be prevented from assuming power.  
The Coalition Provisional council was said to be "balanced" with twelve Shi'ites and thirteen 
others. However six of the twelve Shi'ites are émigrés with no support in the Shi'ite community. 
Even if a political figure is nominally a Shi'ite, he or she has to have some way to garner the 
loyalty of followers in the community. Confessional identity is never enough in and of itself. 
Ahmad Chalabi, who misled the United States repeatedly in planning for the invasion, and who 
has zero credibility with Iraqis, was touted as a future leader of Iraq in editorials in the Wall Street 
Journal by Bernard Lewis, this administration's apparent house "expert" on things Islamic.[11] 
One of Chalabi's supposed credentials was that he was a Shi'ite.[12]  
However, the most serious error in transition to a new regime was the initial failure of U.S. 
administrators to take into account the spiritual leadership of the grand ayatollahs of Iraq. Their 
support will be crucial for any planned governmental action. This was proven when Sistani 
opposed American plans for governmental transition and the United States had to back down.  
Shi'ite Rivalries 
The myth of the Shi'ite monolith still persists for most Americans on the ground in Iraq. Americans 
do not understand that the Shi'ite community is extremely diverse and complex. It predates, and 
therefore transcends national borders. Personal relationships between grand ayatollahs may 
seem cordial on the surface, particularly when they are institutionalized in "seminaries," known as 
hawzat `ilmiyyah, or "collegia of knowledge," but these relationships are fraught with rivalry.  
Shi'a Islam differs from Sunni Islam in a number of historical and philosophical ways. However, 
one important difference is that Sunni Islam is organized into legal "schools." Shi'ism is 
dependant on individual personalities—marja-e taqlid. There is no formal clergy in Islam. Anyone, 
male or female, can study theology and whereas one may receive a "certificate" for having 
studied certain things, there is no official certification for the clergy. Technically, any Muslim can 
lead prayer or offer religious opinions.  
The Shi'a system is based on consensus. When a person is known for their knowledge and 
wisdom, they are a faqih or "jurisprudent" (literally a person who practices fiqh, or "reason"). A 
very prominent faqih becomes known as a mujtahid, or "practitioner of exegesis," in short, such 
people are trusted to interpret Islamic law. When such person due to his (or her) superior 
personal qualities and knowledge becomes a focal point for persons to follow, and prominent 
religious persons endorse the views of that person, then the mujtahid becomes a marja' al-
taqlid,[13] and to follow him in religious matters is called taqlid. Technically, a marja' al-taqlid is a 
"grand ayatollah" in common parlance.[14]  
Ithna-Ashara Shi'ism, or "Twelver" Shi'ism is the dominant doctrine in Iran. Its name derives from 
the belief of its adherents in twelve Imams, who were leaders of the faithful, and direct 
descendants of the Prophet Mohammad. The twelfth imam, Mohammad al-Mahdi, disappeared in 
infancy. He is said to be in "occultation" until the end of the world. In the meantime, adherents to 
the Twelver Shi'a doctrine are technically without a present leader. 
Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who at the time of the Iranian Revolution, was the marja' al-
taqlid with the largest number of followers in the Twelver Shi'a world, introduced a completely 
new doctrine: the Velayat-e Faqih or "Regency of the Jurisprudent."[15] In this doctrine, the chief 
jurisprudent, the most prominent grand ayatollah, would rule over the faithful in the absence of 
the Twelfth Imam, thus becoming the supreme leader. Khomeini's doctrine was rejected by every 
other grand ayatollah. Traditionally Shi'a spiritual leaders had eschewed temporal power, and 
many felt that Khomeini's innovation was heretical. Nevertheless, his charisma and leadership 
skills were sufficient to convince the Iranian electorate to ratify a constitution granting the 
supreme leader unelected power over all aspects of government. Part of the reasoning was that 
the supreme leader was already acknowledged as such by the population by virtue of his 
knowledge, piety and personal character, and so did not need to be elected.  
Sistani, arguably Iraq's most revered Shi'ite spiritual leader, gave an interview to the Arabic 
newspaper Al Hayat on April 18 through his son. Sistani's son spoke of "serious dangers that are 
directed at the religious figures, and even his eminence As-Sayyid al-Sistani." Georgetown 
University Middle East scholar Daniel Brumberg interprets this not as opposition to the United 
States, but to other Shi'ites who are trying to usurp Sistani's authority.  
One of those Shi'ite rivals is Muqtada al-Sadr, one of the few surviving descendants of Grand 
Ayatollah Mohamed Bakr al-Sadr, who was executed on Saddam Hussein's orders in 1980. 
Muqtada al-Sadr is only 22, but is a firebrand.[16] Reporter Lara Marlowe of the Ireland Times 
quotes one Shi'ite in Baghdad: "The young people in Najaf follow Muqtada, but the older 
ayatollahs say he doesn't have enough knowledge."[17] Because Muqtada is not yet an ayatollah, 
one can see why Sistani would decry his attempts at leadership. 
On April 21, 2003, U.S. troops arrested one of al-Sadr's lieutenants, Shaikh Muhammad al-
Fartusi and two other clerics at a Baghdad checkpoint when they gathered a huge crowd of 
Shi'ites in Baghdad to denounce the United States at Friday prayers. Al-Fartusi said in his 
sermon that the United States could not impose a formal "democracy" on Iraq that allowed 
freedom of individual speech but denied Iraqis the ability to shape their own government. Al-
Fartusi's arrest provoked a demonstration of five thousand Shi'ites in front of the Palestine Hotel. 
The gathering and the sermon were preparatory to a pilgrimage to the holy city of Karbala, site of 
the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, grandson of the prophet Mohammad. This time of year, the holy 
month of Muharram, is the time for such pilgrimages, long suppressed by Saddam Hussein. Thus 
the arrest of al-Fartusi was read as suppression of Shi'ite religious practice by the U.S. Army. Al-
Fartusi's arrest was also widely viewed as a backhanded attempt to weaken al-Sadr.  
Continued attacks against Sadr over the last month reveal much about the nature of the Iraqi 
Shi'ite community. The attacks were most likely prompted by Ahmad Chalabi, who saw him as a 
threat to his own future rule of Iraq. The attack against al-Sadr's organization took place on April 
3. On April 4, Bremer announced the new defense minister for the post-June 30 government, Ali 
Allawi, who is Chalabi's nephew. The coincidence is hard to dismiss. 
When al-Sadr struck back with his al-Mahdi Army, the first accusation out of the gate was that he 
was "supported by Iran." The accusation came from neo-conservative Michael Rubin of the 
American Enterprise Institute, who until recently was an advisor to the U.S.-led Coalition 
Provisional Authority. Rubin laid out a baroque set of connections between Iran and al-Sadr. 
Rubin named Ayatollah Kazim al-Husayni al-Haeri, a cleric based in the Iranian shrine city of 
Qom, as a conduit of funding to Sadr. Predictably, the news headline became, "Iran supports al-
Sadr rebellion!" Having briefed the Department of Defense on this implausible scenario, he also 
published it on April 6 in the National Review.[17] The cry was quickly taken up by conservative 
New York Times columnists William Safire and David Brooks, thus ensuring that this tenuous 
connection would become common wisdom.[18] Finally, Rubin's American Enterprise Institute 
colleague, Michael Ledeen, took up the cry again in the Wall Street Journal.[19]  
Rubin's story conflates personal and political connections with religious ones. In an interview in 
Qom on April 13, Hossein al-Haeri, younger brother of Ayatollah Haeri and a fellow cleric, said 
that while al-Sadr was his brother's "religious representative" in Iraq, they had no "political 
relationship." "My brother was a friend of Moqtada al-Sadr's father, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed 
Sadiq al-Sadr from the time they were classmates," he said. The elder al-Sadr was killed by 
Saddam Hussein in 1999. These kinds of clerical and family connections are legion in the Shi'ite 
world, where seminary students frequently maintain lifetime ties, even marrying into each other's 
families. The Daily Star of Beirut confirmed this on April 17 with an interview with Ayatollah al-
Haeri. The spokesman said: "People thought that everything he said he got directly from 
Ayatollah Haeri. But we've said that's not true. As a result, the Sadr group doesn't have much of a 
relationship with the ayatollah anymore."[20]  
It is worth mentioning that the murdered Shi'ite leader, Mohammed Baqir Al-Hakim, who founded 
the Council of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (SCIRI) in 1982, was a recent arrival to Iraq. Like the 
other grand ayatollahs, Al-Hakim came from a respected Shi'ite clerical lineage. He lived in Iran in 
exile for twenty years, and has many followers in both Iran and Iraq. He was deeply worrisome to 
the Bush administration. When he returned to Iraq in September 2003, he was immediately killed 
at the al-Hussein mosque in the holy city of Najaf.  
One of the more astounding events in the relationship between the United States and Iraq was a 
memorial service for Sheikh al-Hakim held at the Pentagon on September 27, 2003, in which 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz recited the fatiha,[21] and then went on to praise al-
Hakim, saying, "His untimely death deprived Iraq of an important leader at a time when men like 
him are badly needed."[22] Since U.S. officials had been making ominous noises about Iranian 
influence in Iraq, and citing the existence of Sheikh al-Hakim as proof, it was an astonishing 
reversal to hear him praised in this way.  
The U.S. administration fails to appreciate that Khomeini based his Islamic Republic on a 
religious doctrine that every other grand ayatollah considered heretical. It is for this reason that 
the Iranian form of government feared by Rumsfeld is anathema to Iraqi Shi'ites. Khomeini 
commandeered the Revolution of 1978-79, and became the author of the Islamic Republic 
because he had the most followers. He gained those followers by being the most outspoken critic 
of the Shah.  
Despite the tenuous family ties between al-Sadr and Haeri, the Iranian clerics look with 
disapproval, if not downright condemnation, at the actions of al-Sadr. Were it not for the memory 
of his revered father, they would likely condemn him outright. The idea that they, much less 
official Iranian state institutions, would be supporting him financially is flatly illogical. Al-Sadr has 
no desire to be beholden to these senior clerics. His staunch Iraqi nationalism is one reason, and 
his view that they are all too quiescent puts him firmly in another political world.  
In the meantime, the Bush administration, deeply worried about the escalating military 
engagement, resulting from the ill-advised attack against al-Sadr, was actually consulting Iran, 
trying to find ways to defuse the violence. Working through back-channel State Department 
contacts and the Swiss Embassy, which represents U.S. interests in Iran (there are no formal 
diplomatic relations), U.S. officials were consulting steadily with the Iranian foreign ministry. The 
United States hoped that the Iranians would be able to persuade more moderate clerics such as 
Sistani, himself an Iranian, to condemn al-Sadr, or mediate in the conflict. At the same time these 
talks were being held, Iranians were reading "experts" in American newspapers stating that they 
were to blame for al-Sadr's violence against the United States.  
Predictably, the Iranians abandoned the talks on April 14. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal 
Kharrazi simply walked out, announcing that no progress was being made. "Previously, we had 
dialogue'' about Iraq, Kharrazi stated. "Currently it has stopped because we felt we were going 
nowhere. The Americans give promises but don't keep their promises. Currently, they are taking 
a wrong path.''[23]  
In the end, the Iranians did send an unofficial delegation. They wanted to do this, of course, but 
they were not going to seem to do it at the request of the United States. Iraqis were so supportive 
of Iranian attempts to mediate that they killed an Iranian embassy official on his way to work.[24]  
A Shi'ite Dominated Government 
What would a Shi'ite dominated government look like? Although it is difficult to tell in advance, a 
Shi'ite government might not at all be unworkable for the United States. The problem is, because 
no one has ever let the Shi'ites govern, they are an unknown quantity. The debates surrounding 
the Islamic Republic of Iran provide some clues. Most serious Shi'ite theologians believe in some 
kind of separation of religion and state. Even Khomeini first thought he would retire to Qom and 
render judgments on theological issues when asked. However, operating in violation of Islamic 
law, as interpreted by one or more ayatollahs, is blasphemous. Iran's solution was the very 
unworkable Council of Guardians that has virtually frozen the Iranian government and created 
enormous frustration. Iraqi Shi'ites don't want that; however, they also do not want to be 
disenfranchised by a foreign power like the United States, as has happened too often in their 
history. This was the basis for Sistani's objection to the Iraqi draft constitution that gave minorities 
substantial veto power.  
We can expect that if left to their own devices, a Shi'ite dominated government would adopt 
models that it already knows. This would be a parliamentary system, probably with a religious 
judiciary. The judiciary might also serve as a religious council, which would be necessary to 
hammer out differences between different theologians about the nature and application of law.  
They would have good relations with Iran, because Shi'ism does transcend national boundaries. 
Religious schools have important interconnections between faculty and students. Also, pilgrimage 
to Iraq is almost as important for Shi'ites as the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, they would not be 
dominated by Iran, but would pursue a separate political course. 
No Better than the British 
From the perspective of Iraqi Shi'ites, the United States is neither better nor worse than the 
British seventy years ago. One would think that the situation would be improved today with all the 
hindsight at our disposal. The current Iraq crisis and the failed diplomatic interaction with Iran 
recapitulates almost every mistake the United States has made in Iraq since the beginning of the 
conflict. First the Bush administration listens to the wrong people. They take the wrong action, 
and then they try to blame someone else (like Iran) for their mistake. Finally they stand firm and 
repeat slogans to cover their ineffectiveness. Even when the people they try to blame are as 
denigrated as Iran, the world can see how pitifully weak both the actions and the excuses for 
these actions have become. 
Ironically, this posturing is unnecessary. Treated with respect and understanding the Shi'ite 
community will cooperate with the construction of a new government. President Bush has taken 
to heart the advice that Arabs respect strength and despise weakness. This underlies much of his 
posturing of late. However, empty bluster and bravado only invites ridicule in the Arab world; it is 
not a sign of strength at all. Moreover, strength must be accompanied by other qualities—honor, 
mercy and the ability to reward one's loyal supporters. Sistani is one such "strong horse" of a true 
variety. Bush would do well to emulate his style.  
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